Resumen: El objetivo del presente trabajo es acercarnos no ya en clave epistemológica a la pregunta específica que se realiza respecto de la teoría literaria, sino por el contrario, a la pregunta mediada por la idea de verdad que la filosofía le ha hecho a la literatura. Creemos que en los textos de Platón existe una intuición fundamental que de manera implícita ha puesto en marcha múltiples aparatos teóricos que intentaron dar cuenta de la literatura. La intuición, sin dilaciones, es (...) la siguiente: la poesía no es matemática. Nuestro interés entonces es reconocer las periferias del diálogo inaugurado por Platón entre el concepto de verdad y la idea de literatura, como así también sus recíprocas determinaciones, y su pregnancia en los discursos que han abordado a la literatura en clave teórica.: In the present work the objective is not only to approach in an epistemological key to the specific question asked by literary theory but rather the question, mediated by the idea of truth, that philosophy has done to literature. We believe that in Plato's texts there is a fundamental intuition that implicitly has set in motion multiple theoretical devices that tried to account for literature. The intuition, without delay, is the following: poetry is not mathematical. Our interest then is to recognize the peripheries of the dialogue inaugurated by Plato between the concept of truth and the idea of literature, as well as their reciprocal determinations, and their pregnancy in the discourses that have addressed literature in a theoretical key. (shrink)

In the present work we will try to make a critical approach to the treatment, by the russian formalism, of the category of history. To the extent that russian formalism resists, because of its heterogeneous nature, to be reduced to a lax set of principles, we will try to observe the way in which the category of the history was worked throughout the years of formal school activity. In this framework, we will highlight the epistemological implications of each of these (...) positions, without losing sight of the set of philosophical and scientific discourses in vogue in the Soviet Union of the 1920s. (shrink)

Si la teoría literaria es considerada una forma muy específica de saber, es porque ella se otorga a sí misma no un dominio sino más bien un objeto, que es el producto de la práctica científica, y no su base. De este modo, y desde nuestra perspectiva, creemos que puede resultar de utilidad abordar la teoría literaria “planteando la cuestión de su relación con su objeto, por lo tanto, planteando simultáneamente la cuestión de la especificidad de su objeto y la (...) cuestión de la especificidad de su relación con este objeto”. La caracterización exhaustiva del trabajo crítico sobre la literatura, entonces, no puede realizarse, como lo ha hecho la historiografía contemporánea, mediante la mera descripción empírica de su labor. Es necesario, por el contrario, exponer la forma de racionalidad específica de su empresa. Esto supone que la crítica epistemológica al campo clásico del estudio de la literatura, como también la crítica a aquellas propuestas historiográficas que lo abordan de manera insuficiente sólo se hace posible, en principio, a través de dos preguntas centrales: la pregunta por el objeto de conocimiento específico que se brinda la teoría literaria, y la pregunta por el método que la teoría utiliza para tratar su objeto. (shrink)

According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them. Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations: admiration casts people in a completely positive light, while contempt casts aspersion on them. Therefore, insofar as they lack the (...) capacity for nuance, these emotions are systematically unfitting and misleading. This paper discusses this objection as originally formulated by John Doris as well as Macalester Bell’s response. Drawing from research on emotional intentionality, it will be argued that Doris’ and Bell’s accounts are respectively misguided criticisms and inadequate defences of these emotions. Their mistake lies in an invalid transition from the claim that these emotions are intentionally directed towards persons to the claim that they deliver global evaluations of those towards whom they are directed. By rejecting this inference, it will be shown that these emotions can deliver nuanced and fitting evaluations in a way Doris’ objection overlooks and Bell’s response precludes us from articulating. (shrink)

Roberto Esposito is one of the most prolific and important exponents of contemporary Italian political theory.

This book by Roberto Esposito - a leading Italian political philosopher - is a highly original exploration of the relationship between human bodies and societies. The original function of law, even before it was codified, was to preserve peaceful cohabitation between people who were exposed to the risk of destructive conflict. Just as the human body's immune system protects the organism from deadly incursions by viruses and other threats, law also ensures the survival of the community in a life-threatening (...) situation. It protects and prolongs life. But the function of law as a form of immunization points to a more disturbing consideration. Like the individual body, the collective body can be immunized from the perceived danger only by allowing a little of what threatens it to enter its protective boundaries. This means that in order to escape the clutches of death, life is forced to incorporate within itself the lethal principle. Starting from this reflection on the nature of immunization, Esposito offers a wide-ranging analysis of contemporary biopolitics. Never more than at present has the demand for immunization come to characterize all aspects of our existence. The more we feel at risk of being infiltrated and infected by foreign elements, the more the life of the individual and society closes off within its protective boundaries, forcing us to choose between a self-destructive outcome and a more radical alternative based on a new conception of community. (shrink)

This paper makes first steps toward a systematic investigation of how pertinence to topic contributes to determine deductively valid reasoning along with preservation of designated values. I start from the interpretation of Weak Kleene Logic WKL as a reasoning tool that preserves truth and topic pertinence, which is offered by Jc Beall. I keep Beall’s motivations and I argue that WKL cannot meet them in a satisfying way. In light of this, I propose an informal definition of a topic-sensitive logic (...) and I proceed to turn it into a formal one by deploying the topic-algebraic framework from the Topic-Sensitive Intentional Modalities project by Francesco Berto. I apply the framework in order to define semantically a ‘classical topic-sensitive logic’ CTSL that meets Beall’s motivations and proves topic-sensitive. Then, I prove results that connect CTSL and any possible topic-sensitive logic to the tradition of containment logics and provide a unification tool for a wide range of recent proposals in philosophical logic. A topic-theoretical interpretation of WKL is then offered without prejudice to the fact that the logic is not topic-sensitive. Finally, the paper discusses some conceptual issues and research perspectives. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between Stakeholder Engagement (SE) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), approaching CSR as a complex system made up of components and interactions. Adopting a System Thinking approach to analyze CSR in a stakeholders-company network, explorative research is conducted through three stages: (1) a critical literature review aimed to identify the components of the CSR system model, (2) the development of the dataset and of the Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) model, (3) the analysis of the CSR behavior (...) in light of the ‘system archetypes’ underpinning the system. The analysis reveals both the structure and the dynamics of CSR and explain its behavior in light of the stakeholder engagement network variables. Findings from this research underscore the existence of six feedback loops, which characterize the relation CSR-SE. The ‘company-stakeholder fit’ acts as a growth engine for the stakeholder engagement network, however other balancing dynamics (e.g., detriment of business objectives) require a tradeoff between Social and Business orientation. This paper contributes to a more profound understanding of the relation between CSR and stakeholder engagement, showing in particular the link between CSR and SE under the assumption of stakeholder-company network. The insights provided serve as a guide for managers and policymakers to navigate the complex dynamics of SE to inform effective strategies of CSR based on network structural actions. (shrink)

This unique textbook states and proves all the major theorems of many-valued propositional logic and provides the reader with the most recent developments and trends, including applications to adaptive error-correcting binary search. The book is suitable for self-study, making the basic tools of many-valued logic accessible to students and scientists with a basic mathematical knowledge who are interested in the mathematical treatment of uncertain information. Stressing the interplay between algebra and logic, the book contains material never before published, such as (...) a simple proof of the completeness theorem and of the equivalence between Chang's MV algebras and Abelian lattice-ordered groups with unit - a necessary prerequisite for the incorporation of a genuine addition operation into fuzzy logic. Readers interested in fuzzy control are provided with a rich deductive system in which one can define fuzzy partitions, just as Boolean partitions can be defined and computed in classical logic. Detailed bibliographic remarks at the end of each chapter and an extensive bibliography lead the reader on to further specialised topics. (shrink)

"A pleasure to read. Gracefully written by a scholar well grounded in the relevant philosophical, historical, and technical background.... a helpfully clarifying review and analysis of some issues of importance to recent philosophy of science and a source of some illuminating insights."—Burke Townsend, Philosophy of Science.

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 37-39.

Se intentan poner de manifiesto isomorfismos estructurales en las teorías de Heidegger y Husserl sobre tiempo e historia. En relación con Ser y tiempo, la atención está puesta en la tesis compartida de que la historiografía está arraigada en la historicidad y esta en la temporeidad. Con referencia al curso de 1934 se pone de relieve la convergencia heideggeriana de misión, encargo y trabajo, que remiten al futuro, al pasado y al presente. Se muestran nociones equivalentes en los niveles que (...) Husserl distingue en la historia: protohistoria, historia efectiva e historia racional. Finalmente, en lo que atañe al viraje, se trazan paralelos entre el Ereignis y el presente viviente como instancias últimas de una indagación restrospectiva, entre la temporeidad del Dasein y al tiempo inmanente como resonancias de una dimensión profunda, y en torno de una conexión mutua en el análisis de la historia en términos de desviación, reposición, incorporación y superación, esto es, los momentos que componen la noción de Gewind. (shrink)

Roberto Esposito is one of leading figures in a new generation of Italian philosophers. This book criticizes the notion of the person and develops an original account of the concept of the impersonal - what he calls the third person.

This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final part we also consider (...) the idea of non-standard geographies, which may be associated with geography under a classical conception in the same sense in which non-standard logics are associated with classical logic. (shrink)

A wide family of many-valued logics—for instance, those based on the weak Kleene algebra—includes a non-classical truth-value that is ‘contaminating’ in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula φ⁠, any complex formula in which φ appears is assigned that value as well. In such systems, the contaminating value enjoys a wide range of interpretations, suggesting scenarios in which more than one of these interpretations are called for. This calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating (...) values. In this paper, we consider the countably infinite family of multiple-conclusion consequence relations in which classical logic is enriched with one or more contaminating values whose behavior is determined by a linear ordering between them. We consider some motivations and applications for such systems and provide general characterizations for all consequence relations in this family. Finally, we provide sequent calculi for a pair of four-valued logics including two linearly ordered contaminating values before defining two-sided sequent calculi corresponding to each of the infinite family of many-valued logics studied in this paper. (shrink)

Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists.

This article addresses some useful coordinates for the analysis of the relationship between philosophy and taxation. My argument aims to show the relevance of a philosophy of taxation and thus draw attention to civic education required to shape a democratic public reason, truthful, critical and attentive. I emphasize the character of “donation” that is the rule of law within a democratic constitutional regime, which depends on tax payments for the purposes proposed, and particularly those of a social distributive justice. I (...) distinguish between charity and justice and political obligation to maintain that by implementing an effective "rule of law" citizens “donate” ourselves mechanisms and procedures for advancing a system of justice as fairness. This grant does not pertain to the field of natural duties, charity or sacrifice of supererogatory acts, but is expressed in institutional programs whose implementation and maintenance required from us pay taxes, but always based on personal commitment. Thus, close to John Rawls I emphasize the value of freedom. (shrink)

That emotions are especially valuable for our well-being has become a widely agreed upon claim. In this article, we argue that many of the ways in which the emotions are commonly considered to be prudentially valuable – hedonically, experientially, and adaptively – are not specific to the emotions: they are in fact shared by other affective reactions such as drives and sensory affects. This may suggest that emotions are not prudentially valuable in any distinctive manner. We challenge this suggestion by (...) arguing that, unlike other affective reactions, emotions provide unique contexts in which to refine our general sensibility to a wide variety of evaluative properties – and that in this sense they are prudentially valuable in a distinctive way. (shrink)

This study documents how people who inject drugs in rural Puerto Rico perceive payments for participating in HIV epidemiological studies. In-depth interviews were conducted among a subset of active PWID older than 18 years of age who had been previously enrolled in a much larger study. Findings suggest that financial compensation was the main motivation for initially enrolling in the parent study. Then, as trust in the researchers developed, participants came to perceive compensation as part of a reciprocal exchange in (...) which they assisted researchers by providing a trustful account of their experiences and researchers reciprocated with financial support. (shrink)

Não é pensando que criamos mundos. É compreendendo o mundo que aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisão é um termo que deve significar um conjunto de fundamentos dos quais emerge uma compreensão sistêmica do Universo, seus componentes como a vida, o mundo em que vivemos, a natureza, o fenômeno humano e suas relações. Trata-se, portanto, de um campo da filosofia analítica alimentado pelas ciências, cujo objetivo é esse conhecimento agregado e epistemologicamente sustentável sobre tudo o que somos e contemos, que nos cerca (...) e que nos relaciona de alguma forma. É algo tão antigo quanto o pensamento humano e, além de utilizar elementos da cosmologia científica, engloba tudo na filosofia e na ciência que se refere ao universo e à vida. Uma cosmovisão não é um conjunto de ideias, hipóteses e suposições, mas um sistema baseado em observação, análise, evidência e demonstração. Nenhuma cosmovisão pretende definir, estabelecer, propor, mas apenas compreender, analisar e interpretar. Cada um de nós constrói e transporta sua cosmovisão ao longo da vida, sem estabelecer formas, como pano de fundo para nosso pensamento e comportamento. Linguisticamente, o termo “cosmovisão” derivaria do alemão, equivalente ao conceito de “ Weltanschauung”, usado por vários filósofos. No entanto, essa relação linguística não é aplicável porque contraria o que propomos como cosmovisão. Esta palavra alemã refere-se a uma visão pré-lógica ou proto-experimental da realidade, com um contexto intuitivo e longe de um conhecimento crítico ainda inexistente no momento da sua formulação. Sem dúvida, as cosmovisões , no sentido em que as entendemos, abrigam e utilizam esses elementos protoexperimentais ou pré-lógicos que incluem a história, o inconsciente coletivo e todos os arquétipos que carregamos. No entanto, no conceito que aqui aplicamos, a cosmovisão vai muito além desse conteúdo, primeiro por submetê-lo constantemente ao pensamento crítico presente e, finalmente, por tornar a experiência analítica (e não o próprio pensamento ou intuição) seu universo real. António Lopes expõe a amplitude deste conteúdo: -/- “Cosmovisões não são o produto do pensamento. Não nascem do simples desejo de saber. A apreensão da realidade é um momento importante em sua configuração, mas, no entanto, é apenas um. Vem da conduta vital, da experiência da vida, da estrutura de nossa totalidade psíquica. A elevação da vida à consciência no conhecimento da realidade, na valorização da vida e na realidade volitiva é o trabalho lento e árduo que a humanidade tem feito no desenvolvimento das concepções de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” Neste trabalho, buscamos traçar uma cosmovisão baseada nas realidades que a ciência oferece hoje. Não nos propomos, em nenhum momento, a fazer ciência ou teorizar a filosofia, mas sempre buscaremos ser apoiados por elas ou, pelo menos, protegidos por elas das distorções cognitivas que costumamos carregar. (shrink)

Ce n'est pas en pensant que nous créons des mondes. C'est en comprenant le monde que nous apprenons à penser. La cosmovision est un terme qui devrait désigner un ensemble de fondements d'où émerge une compréhension systémique de l'Univers, de ses composantes comme la vie, le monde dans lequel nous vivons, la nature, le phénomène humain et leurs relations. C'est donc un champ de la philosophie analytique nourri par les sciences, dont l'objectif est cette connaissance agrégée et épistémologiquement soutenable de (...) tout ce que nous sommes et contenons, qui nous entoure, et qui nous concerne de quelques manières que ce soit. C'est quelque chose d'aussi vieux que la pensée humaine et, en plus d'utiliser des éléments de la cosmologie scientifique, il englobe tout ce qui, dans la philosophie et la science, se réfère à l'univers et à la vie. Une cosmovision n'est pas un ensemble d'idées, d'hypothèses et de suppositions, mais un système établi sur l'observation, l'analyse, la preuve et la démonstration. Aucune cosmovision n'entend définir, établir ou proposer, mais seulement comprendre, analyser et interpréter. Chacun de nous construit et transporte sa cosmovision tout au long de sa vie, sans établir de forme, comme toile de fond de nos pensées et de nos comportements. Linguistiquement, le terme « cosmovision » dériverait de l'allemand, équivalent au concept de « Weltanschauung », tel qu'il a été utilisé par plusieurs philosophes. Cependant, cette relation linguistique n'est pas applicable, car elle contredit ce que nous proposons comme cosmovision. Ce mot allemand fait référence à une vision prélogique ou proto-expérimentale de la réalité, avec un contexte intuitif et loin des connaissances critiques encore inexistantes au moment de sa formulation. Sans aucun doute, les cosmovisions, au sens où nous les entendons, abritent et utilisent ces éléments proto-expérimentaux ou prélogiques qui incluent l'histoire, l'inconscient collectif et tous les archétypes que nous portons. Or, dans le concept que nous appliquons ici, la cosmovision va bien au-delà de ce contenu, d'abord en le soumettant constamment à la pensée critique actuelle et enfin en faisant de l'expérience analytique (et non de la pensée elle-même ou de l'intuition) son univers réel. António Lopes expose l'étendue de ce contenu : [ ] « Les cosmovisions ne sont pas le produit de la pensée. Ils ne naissent pas du simple désir de savoir. L'appréhension de la réalité est un moment important dans sa configuration, mais, néanmoins, ce n'en est qu'un. Elle vient de la conduite vitale, de l'expérience de la vie, de la structure de notre totalité psychique. L'élévation de la vie à la conscience dans la connaissance de la réalité, dans l'évaluation de la vie et dans la réalité volitive est le travail lent et ardu que l'humanité a fait dans le développement des conceptions de la vie. (W.Dilthey, 1992 [1911] : 120). Dans cet ouvrage, nous cherchons à esquisser une cosmovision fondée sur les réalités que la science offre aujourd'hui. Nous ne proposons, à aucun moment, de faire de la science ; ou théoriser la philosophie, mais nous chercherons toujours à être soutenus par eux ou, du moins, protégés par eux des distorsions cognitives que nous portons habituellement. -/- . (shrink)

Nicht durch das Denken erschaffen wir Welten. Indem wir die Welt verstehen, lernen wir zu denken. Kosmovision ist ein Begriff, der eine Reihe von Grundlagen bedeuten sollte, aus denen ein systemisches Verständnis des Universums, seiner Bestandteile als Leben, der Welt, in der wir leben, der Natur, des menschlichen Phänomens und ihrer Beziehungen hervorgehen sollte. Es handelt sich also um ein von den Wissenschaften gespeistes Feld der analytischen Philosophie, deren Ziel dieses aggregierte und erkenntnistheoretisch nachhaltige Wissen über alles ist, was wir (...) sind und beinhalten, was uns umgibt und was uns in einer Weise betrifft. Sie ist so alt wie das menschliche Denken und umfasst neben der Verwendung von Elementen der wissenschaftlichen Kosmologie alles in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, was sich auf das Universum und das Leben bezieht. Eine Kosmovision ist keine Sammlung von Ideen, Hypothesen und Annahmen, sondern ein System, das auf Beobachtung, Analyse, Beweisen und Demonstrationen basiert. Keine Kosmovision will definieren, etablieren oder vorschlagen, sondern nur verstehen, analysieren und interpretieren. Jeder von uns baut und transportiert sein ganzes Leben lang seine Kosmovision, ohne Formen zu etablieren, als Hintergrund für unser Denken und Handeln. In dieser Arbeit versuchen wir, eine Kosmovision zu skizzieren, die auf den Realitäten basiert, die die Wissenschaft heute bietet. Wir schlagen zu keinem Zeitpunkt vor, Wissenschaft zu betreiben; oder Philosophie zu theoretisieren, aber wir werden immer versuchen, von ihnen unterstützt oder zumindest vor den kognitiven Verzerrungen geschützt zu werden, die wir normalerweise mit uns herumtragen. (shrink)

Космовидение - термин, под которым следует понимать совокупность оснований, из которых возникает системное понимание Вселенной, таких ее составляющих, как жизнь, мир, в котором мы живем, природа, феномен человека, и их взаимосвязей. таким образом, это область аналитической философии, питаемая науками, целью которой является совокупное и эпистемологически устойчивое знание обо всем, чем мы являемся и что в нас содержится, что нас окружает и что так или иначе с нами связано. это старое, как человеческая мысль, понятие, которое не только использует элементы научной космологии, (...) но и охватывает все, что относится к вселенной и жизни в философии и науке. Космовидение — это не набор идей, гипотез и предположений, а система, основанная на наблюдениях, анализе, доказательствах и демонстрациях. Космовидение не ставит своей целью определить, установить или предложить, а лишь понять, проанализировать и интерпретировать. Каждый из нас строит и переносит свое космовидение в течение жизни, не устанавливая форм, как фон для нашего мышления и поведения. С лингвистической точки зрения термин "космовидение" происходит от немецкого, эквивалентного понятию "Weltanschauung", используемому рядом философов. Однако эта лингвистическая связь неприменима, поскольку противоречит тому, что мы предлагаем в качестве космовидения. Это немецкое слово обозначает дологическое или протоэкспериментальное видение реальности, имеющее интуитивный контекст и далекое от критического знания, еще не существовавшего на момент его формулировки. Несомненно, космовидения в том смысле, как мы их понимаем, содержат и используют эти протоэкспериментальные или дологические элементы, включающие историю, коллективное бессознательное и все архетипы, которые мы носим в себе. Однако в той концепции, которую мы здесь применяем, космовидение выходит далеко за пределы этого содержания, во-первых, постоянно подчиняя его современному критическому мышлению и, наконец, делая аналитический опыт (а не саму мысль или интуицию) своей актуальной вселенной. Антониу Лопес раскрывает широту этого содержания: -/- "Космовидения не являются продуктом мысли. Они не возникают из простого желания знать. Постижение реальности - важный момент в ее конфигурации, но, тем не менее, только один. Оно исходит из жизненного поведения, из жизненного опыта, из структуры нашей психической совокупности. Возвышение жизни до сознания в познании реальности, в оценке жизни и в волевой реальности — это медленная и тяжелая работа, которую проделало человечество в развитии представлений о жизни". (В. Дильтей, 1992 [1911]: 120)". . В данной работе мы стремимся изложить космовидение, основанное на тех реалиях, которые сегодня предлагает наука. Мы ни в коем случае не собираемся заниматься наукой или теоретизировать философию, но всегда будем стремиться опираться на них или, по крайней мере, защищаться ими от тех когнитивных искажений, которые мы обычно несем. (shrink)

What is the relationship between persons and things? And how does the body transform this relationship? In this highly original new book, Roberto Esposito - one of Italy’s leading political philosophers - considers these questions and shows that starting from the body, rather than from the thing or the person, can help us to reconsider the status of both. Ever since its beginnings, our civilization has been based on a strict, unequivocal distinction between persons and things, founded on the (...) instrumental domination of persons over things. This opposition arose out of ancient Roman law and persisted throughout modernity, to take its place in our current global market, where it continues to generate growing contradictions. Although the distinction seems to appear clear and necessary to us, what we are continually witnessing in legal, economic, and technological practice is a reversal of perspectives: some categories of persons are becoming assimilated with things, while some types of things are taking on a personal profile. With his customary rigour, Roberto Esposito argues that there exists an escape route out of this paradox, constituted by a new point of view founded in the body. Neither a person nor a thing, the human body becomes the decisive element in rethinking the concepts and values that govern our philosophical, legal, and political lexicons. (shrink)

Lors de la révolte sociale de 2019, de nombreux slogans ont été écrits sur les murs de Santiago et d’autres villes du Chili. Un malaise collectif s’y inscrivait qui répondait aux conditions générées il y a près de cinquante ans, lorsqu’un coup d’État militaire est venu secouer notre pays. Parmi beaucoup d’autres, le slogan « nous avons perdu la peur » était éloquent.

Neste artigo, temos como objetivo perscrutar o funcionamento da verbo-visualidade de uma perspectiva dialógica do discurso, utilizando, como material de análise, uma videomontagem humorística acerca do ator político Dilma Rousseff, durante a campanha presidencial brasileira do ano de 2010. Primeiramente, procuramos refletir acerca de alguns pressupostos teórico-metodológicos de Bakhtin e de Brait, qual seja, o de verbo-visualidade, alicerçado na concepção bakhtiniana de linguagem. Em um segundo momento, detivemo-nos na análise do texto objeto do artigo, que se pautou na seguinte indagação: (...) como contribuem e funcionam os elementos verbais e visuais para produção e direcionamento de sentidos na videomontagem? Nossa hipótese é a de que os discursos carregados pela montagem criam uma trilha ideológica de sentido que leva os interlocutores a interpretar a então candidata como uma pessoa sem discurso, manipulável. Diante do exposto, tentaremos demonstrar a hipótese que sustentamos. (shrink)

I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's account of (...) scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change. (shrink)

Roberto Schwarz’s 1966 reading reveals the social content of a famously elusive text by Franz Kafka, and hints at its hidden affinities with both the historical moment of Schwarz’s reading and with our own present.

Nonhuman animals are the most prominent alterity with which humans have engaged in interaction and in comparative self-definition. The reference point of nonhuman alterity is central both to the development of humanism and of posthumanism. In the complex and nonlinear interfaces with nonhumans, humans are extensively hybridized in a process that defines their very humanity. Understanding humans as open and interactive animals rather than as closed and autarchic entities is indispensable to the dismantling of humanism and the development of posthuman (...) thought. Nonhuman and human animals host and are hosted by one another in dynamic and emergent relations. (shrink)